Nssm-2.24 Exploit -

However, NSSM 2.24 mitigates this partially by calling SetDllDirectory("") and using fully qualified paths for system DLLs. No public, reliable exploit chain exists for DLL hijacking in 2.24 itself unless the user overrides environment variables.

# Load the malicious configuration file using NSSM nssm_path = "C:\\path\\to\\nssm.exe" subprocess.run([nssm_path, "start", "inet", config_file], check=True) nssm-2.24 exploit

Here is a basic example of an IDS/IPS rule to detect potential NSSM exploit attempts: However, NSSM 2

If the admin does not explicitly set nssm set MyService ObjectName NT AUTHORITY\LocalService , the service runs as LocalSystem (high privilege). An attacker with SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG access (sometimes granted to Users group on misconfigured systems) can change the binary path to cmd.exe /c net user hacker P@ssw0rd /add . nssm-2.24 exploit